National identity or national interest? Scottish, English and Welsh attitudes to the constitutional debate by Henderson, Ailsa et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Henderson, A., Jeffery, C. and Liñeira, R. (2015) National identity or national interest? 
Scottish, English and Welsh attitudes to the constitutional debate. Political Quarterly, 
86(2), pp. 265-274. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/219967/   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 15 July 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
  
1 
 
National identity or national interest?: Scottish, English and Welsh Attitudes to the 
Constitutional Debate 
 
Ailsa Henderson, Charlie Jeffery and Robert Liñeira 
 
Abstract 
This articles analyses political attitudes to the union in England, Scotland and Wales after the Scottish 
independence referendum. Using public opinion data we explore constitutional preferences and 
perceptions of national grievance before examining the role that national identity plays in structuring 
preferences.  Our evidence shows that considerable demand exists for nationally demarcated forms of 
government within the UK, although these constitutional preferences do not translate in support for 
policy diversity across the UK. We also find evidence that these constitutional preferences relate 
closely to national identity, but relate also to appeals to national interest.  
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The outcome of the Scottish independence referendum on 18 September 2014 – a clear No vote – may 
have resolved one constitutional question, but it also opened up a number of others. Following the 
pledges made in the ‘Vow’ of the three main UK-level party leaders on 16 September to shore up the 
No vote, the Smith Commission (after its chair, Lord Smith of Kelvin) was rapidly convened after the 
referendum to generate cross-party proposals for additional Scottish devolution. These were delivered 
by the end of November, with a draft Bill following in January 2015. Although a signatory to the 
cross-party proposals, the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP), buoyed by an 
extraordinary surge in its membership and popular support in opinion polls, immediately began to 
argue for more.  
 
At the same time a different debate began to unfold in England. The day after the Scottish referendum 
the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, made the surprise announcement that he favoured the 
introduction of English Votes on English Laws, or EVEL. EVEL would give MPs from England a 
privileged or, in some versions, exclusive role in deciding laws that had to do with England alone by 
removing Scottish (and, possibly, Northern Irish and Welsh) MPs from the legislative process. EVEL 
is seen as an English counterpart and response to national devolution outside of England. A UK 
Government Command Paper followed in December 2014, setting out a range of different options for 
EVEL as proposed separately by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition partners.  
 
These issues – the extent of additional devolution for Scotland, and whether or not to introduce EVEL 
in England – promised to be prominent issues in the May 2015 general election debate. A less well-
noticed debate also continued in Wales. A new Wales Act was passed at the end of 2014, giving the 
National Assembly for Wales tax-raising powers for the first time. It passed against the backdrop of a 
debate about ‘fair funding’ which focused on the view that Wales was under-funded, in particular 
relative to Scotland.i Then there was the discussion on the devolution of the power to levy corporation 
tax to the Northern Ireland Assembly, which led to the introduction of the Corporation Tax (Northern 
Ireland) Bill to the House of Commons in January 2015. Focused on challenges of cross-border 
competition with the Republic of Ireland, where corporation tax rates are much lower, the debate also 
spilt over into Scotland, feeding SNP demands for additional tax devolution.  
 
What has been notable in Scotland’s constitutional debate is the way in which appeals were made 
before the referendum (and afterwards) both to national identity, but also to more instrumental 
calculations of material interest, whether for Scotland as a whole or individual Scots. The existence of 
Scottish values, and the potential for decisions in an independent Scotland to be made by Scots rather 
than ‘the London Parliament’, combined with the benefits of Scottish control over oil and economic 
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levers were dominant themes in the Yes campaign. On the No side, voters were warned of the risks of 
economic independence, uncertainty over currency and the positive economies of scale – and 
considerable pride – brought by membership of the UK union. The Vow made by the three main UK 
party leaders just before the referendum appealed likewise to both national identity and national 
interest, promising to recognise as permanent the Scottish Parliament as well as maintaining the 
funding formula that ensures, for the time being, higher per capita public spending in Scotland (but 
which, of course, jars so much in Wales). 
 
After the referendum, such claims surfaced again in the debate about more devolution in Scotland, but 
also in different parts of the UK. Calls for EVEL are in part about ‘our’ MPs making decisions on 
‘our’ laws, but also chime with a sense that Scotland gets a better deal than England from current 
arrangements. The Welsh debate, initially driven by the demand for national recognition, has 
increasingly been defined by material issues and again a sense that current arrangements are unjust.  
 
We know from survey evidence across the UKii that national identity has long related to constitutional 
preferences. National interest, used here in the sense of a calculation about fiscal advantage, now also 
appears to play a role in constitutional debate and may with that also structure constitutional 
preferences. 
 
This contribution explores political attitudes to union in England, Scotland and Wales, after the 
Scottish referendum, drawing on a survey of attitudes conducted in November 2014 while the Smith 
Commission was at work. Funding for the survey – hereafter summarised as the Smith survey - was 
provided by the Economic and Social Research Council. The sample included 1500 Scottish residents, 
1000 English residents and 1000 Welsh residents, all aged 18+. Fieldwork for all three surveys 
occurred in early November 2014 through online interviews conducted by ICM.iii What follows is a 
discussion of the survey findings, focused in turn on: 
  
• Preferences on how each of the three nations should be governed 
• The distinctiveness of policy preferences in and across the three nations 
• Attitudes to distributional questions across the three nations 
 
A further section explores the relationship of these attitudes to differences of identity and interest in 
the three nations. The final section suggests how these differences may help shape the continuing 
debate on constitutional reform in the different parts of the UK that looks set to unfold in the coming 
months.  
 
 
National Government within the UK 
 
There were two institutional certainties for the respondents of the 2014 Smith survey. The first was 
that the union should persist. When we asked respondents to indicate their most preferred 
constitutional option, independence was preferred by more respondents in Scotland (42%) than was 
more powers (37%)iv but when we asked respondents to rate different constitutional options on a 0-10 
scale, ‘more powers’ received higher average scores than did independence. This reflects the fact that 
those who want independence give ‘more powers’ higher ratings than those who prefer ‘more powers’ 
give to independence. The preferences for continuing union (with stronger powers for Scotland within 
the union) is a pattern seen across the UK, although people in England and Wales are more firmly 
against Scottish independence than those in Scotland. We provide two sets of scores for Wales, so that 
we can see whether voters prefer one set of constitutional options for Wales and another for Scotland 
but the general pattern of support is similar: greater support for more powers than independence. 
Where they differ is that more Welsh voters would prefer powers to remain unchanged – both for 
Scotland and Wales – than they would independence, while the same is not true in Scotland. Given 
what we know of constitutional preferences in the UK, these results are unsurprising.v  
Table 1: Constitutional Preferences in Britain  
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Scotland England Wales 
Scottish independence 5.9 3.3 4.3 
More powers for Scottish Parliament 6.4 5.8 7.0 
Same powers for Scottish Parliament 3.8 5.4 5.9 
Wales independence - - 4.6 
More powers for Wales Assembly - - 7.6 
Same powers for Wales Assembly - - 7.4 
Source: Smith Survey 2014. Results are mean scores on a 0 to 10 scale. 
 
The second certainty is about the role the UK Government should play. Table 2 presents responses to 
the paired questions of ‘which of the following do you think currently HAS the most influence over 
how’ Scotland, England or Wales ‘is run’ and which ‘SHOULD have the most influence’. On the 
question which does have most influence, opinion is split in Scotland and Wales with the UK 
Government coming out ahead (in Scotland only just) of the respective devolved government. But 
fewer than one in ten Scots and fewer than fifteen percent in Wales think the UK Government should 
have most influence. People in Scotland and Wales evidently want still less of UK-level government 
in their lives and more devolved government.  
 
Table 2: The Influence of Different Levels of Government  
 Which does have most influence?  
Which should have most 
influence? 
  Scotland % 
England 
% 
Wales 
%  
Scotland 
% 
England 
% 
Wales 
% 
UK Government 43 45.4 35.6  8 38.8 14.9 
Devolved Government 33 -- 32.2  68 -- 49.2 
Local Councils 3 2 3.4  7 14.2 10.2 
The EU 5 29.4 6.2  1 1.2 1.1 
Own MPs 4 5.1 3.4  7 30.1 10.4 
Source: Smith Survey 2014 
 
On this measure England stands out, with more respondents there thinking the UK Government does, 
and even more that it should, have most influence. There is an obvious qualification in that the 
choices open to people in England in Table 2, in the absence of any English devolved government, are 
different. Table 2 offers choices between the UK Government, local government and the EU. The 
sense among almost one third of people in England that the EU has most influence is an outlier 
finding compared not just to Scotland and Wales, but also in comparative survey work across a range 
of sub-state jurisdictions in western Europe.vi This provides an indication of the strength of hostile 
feeling about European integration in England, which we explore more fully elsewhere in our reports 
on the separate Future of England Survey.vii But it also skews the findings about the status quo option 
of ‘UK Government’, which scores so highly in England. In the three rounds of the Future of England 
Survey (FoES), for example, we have never found the level of support for the status quo in England to 
reach 30 per cent of respondents. And when the status quo (‘governed as now with laws made by all 
MPs in the UK Parliament’ or more simply ‘keep things as they are at present’) is offered against 
other institutional options it has never been the top preference.  
 
We can see this in an adapted version of the ‘should’ question, as shown in Table 3, where we asked 
‘And what if in the future there were different types of institutions in England. Which of the following 
do you think should have the most influence over the way England is run?’ The Smith survey was 
fielded in November 2014. To put these findings into context we compare them with the most recent 
results for the FoES survey in April 2014. In the earlier survey, the status quo – here described as ‘the 
UK Government’ – is the preference of just 29 per cent, a little behind the top choice of an English 
Parliament, but ahead of stronger local government or elected regional assemblies. By November 
2014 the English institutional debate had increasingly become shaped by two other options: the 
reform of how English legislation is dealt with in the House of Commons (often known as English 
Votes on English Laws, or EVEL); and city-regions, following the example of regional-scale local 
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authority collaboration in and around Manchester. When we included these options EVEL becomes 
the top choice, with an English Parliament second. The status quo – here defined as England governed 
by ‘the UK Parliament with laws decided by all UK MPs’ – is less popular than stronger local 
government. The two regional options – elected assemblies and city-regions – together account for 16 
per cent. Support for EU influence remains vanishingly small.  
 
 
Table 3: ‘Institutional Alternatives for England: Who should have most influence? 
 April 2014 % November 2014 % 
England-wide 
institutions 
  UK Parliament with English laws voted on solely by English MPs 23.1 
English Parliament 30.5 English Parliament 17.3 
UK-wide 
institutions UK Government 29.4 
UK Parliament with laws decided 
by all UK MPs 11.3 
Local institutions Stronger Local Councils 16.3 Stronger local councils 13.3 
Regional 
institutions 
Elected Regional 
Assemblies 10.2 
Elected Regional 
Assemblies 8.5 
  
New Regional Authorities Based 
Around the Major Cities in 
England 
7.0 
European 
institutions The EU 0.7 The EU 0.5 
Other/Don’t Know  12.4  18.8 
Source: Future of England Survey April 2014 (n=3695); Smith Survey 2014 (n=1000) 
 
There are obvious methodological qualifications to be noted in drawing precise inferences across 
different question wordings to describe the status quo in England and in comparing England with 
Scotland and Wales given the different options available. But it seems clear enough that the current 
institutional arrangements for the government of England are popular only in a direct trade-off with 
the EU (Table 2) and are less popular than both England-wide and English sub-national institutional 
alternatives (Table 3). And when the status quo is ranged alongside the alternatives in Table 3, 
support for UK-wide institutions falls to a level comparable to the ‘should’ figures for the UK 
Government in Scotland and Wales in Table 2.  
 
Perhaps the most significant finding in Table 3 is the level of support in England for the political 
institutionalisation of England as a whole, either in the form of EVEL or an English Parliament. 
When both options were offered, they together attracted the support of 40 per cent of respondents. 
This preference for a national form of government in England within the UK is illuminated further in 
Table 4, which identifies preferences on the English constitutional question, including EVEL, and 
English Parliament and different regional options. These preferences were explored in separate 
questions, and therefore did not require respondents to make a relative judgement. This allows us to 
establish a rank order of preferences. EVEL is top and secures majority support.  
 
Table 4: The Preference for National Government in England  
 Total agree 
% 
Changing the rules in Parliament, so that only English MPs can vote on laws that 
would apply only in England (EVEL) 
55.1 
UK government ministers for each of the regions of England 46.9 
English Parliament 43.4 
Secretary of State for England in the UK cabinet 42.6 
New regional authorities based around the major cities in England 36.9 
Source: Smith Survey 2014, n=1000 
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While people in all parts of Great Britain may endorse the continuation of the union, all, given the 
option, would reduce the influence UK-level government has over how their part of the UK is run. 
UK-level government is an unpopular institution everywhere. And there is support everywhere for its 
reduced influence to be reflected in increased influence for some form of national - that is, Scottish, 
Welsh or English - government. People in Great Britain appear to want more fully demarcated forms 
of national government within the UK.  
 
Devolution without Difference? 
 
A strong preference for national political institutions does not automatically mean that citizens want 
those institutions to deliver distinctive national policy preferences. We have noted elsewhere the 
existence of a devolution paradox across regions in Europe,viii namely that voters are keen for their 
regional legislatures to wield additional power, but the automatic consequences of such power, 
namely greater policy control and greater policy variation across regions of the state are not 
necessarily desired. On policy control we typically see fewer contradictory views in Scotland and 
Wales. Voters here, when calling for greater regional control, typically also want greater policy 
control for the region. The paradox usually remains, however, with policy variation. 
 
Table 5 seeks evidence for this paradox in the Smith survey. It shows responses in Scotland, England 
and Wales to the question – asked of six different policy issues - ‘whether you think each policy 
should be the same across the whole of the UK or whether it could vary across the UK’. The 
responses in Table 5 are the percentage in each nation supporting uniform policies. The policy issues 
are a mix of matters currently dealt with uniformly across the UK (unemployment benefits), or that 
vary in Scotland, England and Wales (tuition fees, care for the elderly, prescription charges), or that 
are common in England and Wales but devolved in Scotland (young offenders).  
 
Table 5: Policy Uniformity  
 Scotland 
% 
England 
% 
Wales 
% 
Unemployment benefit 51.3 64.7 59.3 
University tuition fees 34.3 63.0 45.2 
Paying for elderly care 46.1 67.2 55.6 
Punishment of young offenders 56.4 76.3 67.6 
Prescription Charges 36.6 71.7 40.7 
Income tax 47.7 68.4 60.9 
Source: Smith Survey 2014. 
 
In Scotland, where we know there is clear support for more powers, there is also – in line with the 
devolution paradox – majority support for uniform unemployment benefit and uniform punishment of 
young offenders across the UK, that is in one policy field that is currently uniform across the UK 
(unemployment) and one in which powers are devolved (young offenders). For income tax and 
payment of vulnerable old people, there is plurality but not majority support for uniformity. On 
income tax, 48% wanted a uniform policy across the UK, 40% wanted it to vary and 12% said they 
had no preference or didn’t know.  There are similar figures for the care of vulnerable old people 
(46% policy uniformity, 41% policy variation).  Only in two fields is there majority support for policy 
variation in Scotland: prescription charges and university tuition fees.  
 
Support for policy uniformity is considerably higher in England, at 63 per cent or above in all cases. 
Support for uniformity is greatest for prescription charges and the punishment of young offenders, 
both areas where there is currently policy variation. Uniformity on those pillars of what are conceived 
of as a UK-wide welfare state, namely unemployment and income tax, are supported by 65 and 68 per 
cent respectively. 
Support for policy uniformity in Wales lies midway between support in Scotland and England, with 
majority support for uniformity on all but tuition and prescription charges. The argument made by the 
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Commission on Devolution in Walesix, that further devolution to Wales must not undermine the 
existence of a UK-wide welfare state and a UK-wide sense of solidarity, appears to resonate with 
Welsh voters. 
 
For Scottish voters, those areas where there is variation are areas where provision is more generous in 
Scotland than in England. Prescriptions and university tuition are free, and there is also a more 
generous entitlement in Scotland for the care of vulnerable old people. We cannot at present examine 
what attitudes to policy variation would be for a policy field where provision is less generous in 
Scotland because none currently exists. We can test this in Wales, though, and there is greater support 
for uniformity on tuition fees (which are higher in Wales than in Scotland) than prescription charges 
(which are also free).  
 
So the devolution paradox persists: even though people in Scotland, England and Wales want less UK 
government influence and more devolved government (or, in the case of England, more than the other 
alternatives the establishment of national, England-wide institutions), there is limited demand for 
policy difference by nation, especially in England and Wales. And, it seems, voters are less supportive 
of policy variation when they believe they are losing out, and more supportive of policy variation 
where at present they are enjoying more generous provisions. 
 
There are of course different reasons for opposing policy variation. One might be motivated by the 
complications for individuals or companies brought by the existence of different benefit and tax 
systems, or fears of a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of service provision that many assume is associated 
with extensive devolution. On the other hand, one might have individual self interest in mind, 
opposing any system that might led to oneself paying higher taxes or others receiving higher benefits. 
Table 6 summarises the different motivations that respondents in England, Scotland and Wales have 
of policy variation. The general pattern is remarkably similar across the different motivations, 
although in all three nations there is a greater sense of injustice about paying higher taxes than there is 
for objection about different levels of benefit. The primary differences are in the levels of support 
across the constituent parts of Britain. People in Scotland are less persuaded by all three rationales for 
opposing policy variation, people in England most persuaded, with people in Wales in between.  
 
Table 6: Opposition to policy variation, % agree  
 Scotland % 
England 
% 
Wales 
% 
We should keep tax levels the same across the UK because 
it would not be fair if people in different parts of the UK 
received higher levels of benefits 
40.8 61.6 52.4 
    
Keep same because it would not be fair if people in different 
parts of the UK who earned similar wages pay higher tax 
rates 
44.9 65.0 56.6 
    
We should keep tax levels the same to avoid tax competition 
across different parts of UK 43.5 63.4 55.6 
Source: Smith Survey 2014 
 
 
What Best Accounts for Constitutional Preferences? 
 
Those interested in understanding voter preferences in elections can draw on different schools of 
thought. In one view, voters back parties that are likely to act in their personal economic interest or in 
the national economic performance. Parties appealing to national identity, by contrast tap 
psychological orientations. These are not either or explanations, with voters influenced by a range of 
appeals made to their various identities and interests. Certainly we saw evidence of both types of 
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appeals both before and after the Scottish referendum. In this section we explore further whether 
national identity or assessments of the national interest structure constitutional preferences. 
 
 
National interest 
 
Evidence that national interest might relate to constitutional preferences can be seen in the extent to 
which people in England, Scotland and Wales feel that their own and the other parts of the UK are 
receiving more or less than their fair share of public spending. Table 7 shows that such perceptions 
are one-eyed: each thinks it loses out and the others win. Table 7 shows this in responses in Scotland, 
England and Wales to the question whether ‘compared with other parts of the UK, each of these [the 
four nations of the UK, including Northern Ireland] gets pretty much their fair share of public 
spending, more than their fair share, or less than their fair share’. Table 7 presents a complex mosaic 
in detail but boils down in overview to simple dividing lines: people in Scotland and (especially) 
Wales think they are disadvantaged relative to England; and people in England think they are 
disadvantaged relative to everyone else. 
 
Table 7: Unfair Shares? 
  Scotland 
% 
England 
% 
Wales 
% 
Scotland gets … 
More than its fair share   30.0 21.0 19.6 
Its fair share 12.1 37.7 26.7 
Less than its fair share 44.2 10.3 23.5 
    
England gets … 
More than its fair share   30.2 26.2 20.9 
Its fair share 47.6 10.3 47.0 
Less than its fair share  6.8 34.6 8.6 
    
Wales gets … 
More than its fair share   25.7 25.2 10.8 
Its fair share 6.9 15.3 5.1 
Less than its fair share 39.5 24.9 61.0 
    
Northern Ireland gets … 
More than its fair share   23.6 25.1 13.4 
Its fair share 11.4 14.4 10.0 
Less than its fair share 33.0 15.4 32.2 
Source: Smith Survey 2014. 
 
The potential for these distributional grievances to take on constitutional significance is shown in 
Table 8. This reports responses to a question which explored attitudes to additional tax and welfare 
devolution for Scotland, that is the main themes discussed (and then recommended) by the Smith 
Commission.x As shown above in Table 1, people in England and Wales were on balance supportive 
of additional devolution, but Table 8 suggests a caveat: they also agree that ‘levels of public spending 
in Scotland should be reduced to levels in the rest of the UK’. Here, perhaps in the light of the debate 
about ‘fair funding’ in Wales which often focuses on the relative advantage in public spending per 
head that Scotland enjoys, Welsh-Scottish solidarity dissolves. Around half of the respondents in 
Wales agree and only 12 per cent disagree that Scottish public spending should be reduced. The 
pattern of opinion in England was even more strongly for the reduction of Scottish spending. The 
implied message is clear. Scots can have more powers if they want, but will need to pay for them from 
their own resources. Predictably enough Scots were not of the same view.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Reducing Public Spending in Scotland 
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Scotland 
% 
England 
% 
Wales 
% 
Total Agree 22.0 51.8 40.0 
Neither 28.5 25.6 28.6 
Total Disagree 38.7 10.2 14.0 
Don’t Know 10.7 12.4 17.4 
Source: Smith Survey 2014 
 
 
National Identity  
 
The results discussed above help us to see how citizens in England, Scotland and Wales have differing 
interpretations of their national economic interest, and that these impact on views of constitutional 
arrangements. Within each nation these views also intersect with individuals’ sense of national 
identity. So it is not just the case that Scots are more likely to think that they get less than their fair 
share of public spending, but that those who do so, and those who prioritise their Scottish identity, are 
more supportive both of Scottish independence and of policy variation. The same is true in England as 
well. Those prioritising their English identity are more supportive of an English Parliament (30%) 
than those prioritising their British identity (19%). The gap is smaller across the identity categories for 
EVEL, which appears a popular solution across all respondents. Almost 90% of those describing 
themselves as ‘Scottish only’ believe the Scottish Parliament should have the most influence over 
how Scotland is run, while just under half of those describing themselves as ‘British only’ feel the 
same.  
 
Table 9 summarises the relationship between national identity and support for policy variation. It uses 
a common measure of identity which allows respondents to place themselves on a five point scale 
with at one end only having a Scottish (or English, or Welsh) identity and at the other only a British 
identity and a mid point of holding the two identities equally. The relationship between identity and 
support for policy variation is most marked in Scotland. With respect to policy variation on 
unemployment benefit we see an almost thirty percentage point gap between Scottish and British 
identifiers on policy variation, while only five percentage points separate English and British 
identifiers and around seven percentage points separate Welsh and British identifiers. The sole policy 
field in which the pattern of responses for Wales most closely approximates the pattern of support in 
Scotland is that field – prescription charges - where Wales was the first to establish policy variation 
within the UK. This is tentative evidence that the existence of policy variation leads to a stronger 
relationship between national identity and support for continued differentiation. 
 
This general pattern across Scotland, Wales and England suggests that support for variation more 
effectively taps national identity in Scotland than in Wales and England. This contrasts with national 
interests, which appears equally effective across the nations of Britain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: National identity and support for policy variation 
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Scotland 
% 
England 
% 
Wales 
%  
Scotland 
% 
England 
% 
Wales 
% 
Unemployment benefit    Young offenders    
    Nation only 48.7 25.3 29.8     Nation only 43.2 13.4 22.8 
    Nation>state 37.2 29.8 29.3     Nation>state 29.3 13.4 20.4 
    Nation=state 29.0 20.6 26.4     Nation=state 23.9 11.0 18.7 
    State>nation 29.8 26.0 27.9     State>nation 23.8 12.5 15.6 
    State only 20.0 20.0 23.2     State only 20.6 10.4 17.4 
University tuition fees    Prescription charges    
    Nation only 63.8 27.2 42.2     Nation only 54.8 12.7 35.3 
    Nation>state 59.2 29.0 46.0     Nation>state 41.5 25.0 22.2 
    Nation=state 45.9 22.8 39.5     Nation=state 29.9 16.4 12.2 
    State>nation 43.7 28.1 40.2     State>nation 28.9 28.5 8.2 
    State only 36.2 25.7 37.5     State only 20.3 14.7 12.5 
Paying for elderly care    Income tax    
    Nation only 52.8 21.1 37.1     Nation only 63.9 13.6 48.4 
    Nation>state 44.3 23.1 34.3     Nation>state 57.7 15.6 47.5 
    Nation=state 34.2 21.5 29.0     Nation=state 41.5 14.6 44.3 
    State>nation 37.2 24.3 26.8     State>nation 41.1 24.1 50.0 
    State only 25.6 17.1 30.8     State only 36.5 20.0 37.1 
Source: Smith Survey 2014 
 
We can see, therefore, that support for policy variation tends to vary with national identity, and we 
know from above that national interest also matters. What remains, then, is to pit them against each 
other to determine which has a greater impact and whether these relative impacts vary across England, 
Scotland and Wales. The results in table 10 provide a summary of these relationships. We have 
created an aggregate score for support for policy variation across the six policy fields that varies from 
0 (no policy variation preferred) to 1 (policy variation across all six fields preferred). The independent 
variables include national identity (1 if prioritise Scottishness/Englishness/Welshness and 0 
otherwise), self interest, which is measured as the respondent’s income from the minimum (0) to the 
maximum (1) in the dataset, and national interest, which is measured here as the sense that your own 
part of the UK is not getting its fair share of public spending. The results are interesting because of 
how they vary across the three nations. In Scotland, national identity and national interest both matter 
and the same is true in Wales, where income also structures preferences. In both places, the less 
British you feel the more likely you are to back policy variation, and the more you believe your nation 
doesn’t get its fair share, the more likely you are to support policy variation. In Wales, support for 
policy variation is also higher among those with lower incomes. In England, national interest trumps 
identity: you are more likely to support policy variation if you believe England does not get its fair 
share than if you feel English rather than British. This is, of course, but a summary view but it serves 
to highlight that interest and identity operate independently, and that it is collective national interest 
rather than individual self interest that drives constitutional preferences.xi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Explaining support for policy variation: national identity vs national interest 
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 Scotland England Wales 
Nation identity (otherwise) 0.18*** 0.02 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Income (0-1) -0.02 -0.08* -0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
National interest (nation is getting its fair share) 0.08*** -0.04* 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Male (female) 0.04* 0.06*** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Age (0-1) 0.03 -0.22*** -0.17*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Education (0-1) 0.10*** 0.02 0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
    
R2 0.09 0.05 0.05 
N 1,020 625 631 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are OLS unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding sections have shown that there is considerable demand for demarcated forms of 
national government within the UK but that there remains majority and plurality support for policy 
uniformity on almost all policy fields. We might well expect that a year in which Scotland held a 
referendum on independence would be a time of heightened attention to and the influence of national 
identity. Certainly we know from research published elsewhere that national identity is one possible 
predictor of support for independence, with Scottish identifiers tending to back independence more 
than those who describe themselves as primarily British. We know from previous Future of England 
reports that national identity correlates with constitutional preferences in England and Wales as well. 
And yet this only provides us with a partial sense of where such preferences come from. Attitudes can 
be explained in part by the result of appeals to national interest, with each nation perceiving that it is 
less well off than its neighbours, a relationship that explains not only variations across the nations of 
the UK but variations within nations as well.  
 
Certainly we have seen recent evidence of politicians’ appeal to such notions, with English politicians 
emphasizing the unjustness of any solution that does not include English Votes for English Laws – 
most notably made by the Prime Minister the day after the referendum - and long running Welsh 
discontent on the Barnett funding formula (Independence Commission on Funding and Finance for 
Wales 2010). Incoming Scottish Labour leader Jim Murphy has pursued a rhetoric of national interest, 
most recently by noting how higher taxes on English houses would pay for additional nurses in 
Scotland. The promises were not without controversy, prompting negative reaction from English 
politicians across the partisan divide.xii 
 
It is against this backdrop of appeals to national interest that the Smith Commission (2014) made its 
recommendations about the devolution of further power to the Scottish Parliament. The speed with 
which the commission was established and the deadline provided for its report could reasonably be 
seen as quick, particularly when viewed in light of the time between the Edinburgh Agreement and 
Scottish Referendum, but there is no denying that its disintegrative logic chimes with public and 
political opinion in Scotland, England and Wales. 
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